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Abstract
Current neural network-based image classifiers are sus-
ceptible to adversarial examples, even in the black-box set-
ting, where the attacker is limited to query access with-
out access to gradients. Previous methods — substitute
networks and coordinate-based finite-difference methods
— are either unreliable or query-inefficient, making these
methods impractical for certain problems.
We introduce a new method for reliably generating ad-
versarial examples under more restricted, practical black-
box threat models. First, we apply natural evolution strate-
gies to perform black-box attacks using two to three orders
of magnitude fewer queries than previous methods. Sec-
ond, we introduce a new algorithm to perform targeted ad-
versarial attacks in the partial-information setting, where
the attacker only has access to a limited number of target
classes. Using these techniques, we successfully perform
the first targeted adversarial attack against a commercially
deployed machine learning system, the Google Cloud Vision
API, in the partial information setting.
1. Introduction
Neural network-based image classifiers, despite surpass-
ing human ability on several benchmark vision tasks, are
susceptible to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples
are correctly classified images that are minutely perturbed
to cause misclassification. Targeted adversarial examples
cause misclassification as a chosen class, while untargeted
adversarial examples cause just misclassification.
The existence of these adversarial examples and the fea-
sibility of constructing them in the real world [9, 1] points to
potential exploitation, particularly in the face of the rising
popularity of neural networks in real-world systems. For
commercial or proprietary systems, however, adversarial
examples must be considered under a much more restrictive
threat model. First, these settings are black-box, meaning
that an attacker only has access to input-output pairs of the
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classifier, often through a binary or API. Furthermore, often
the attacker will only have access to a subset of the classi-
fication outputs (for example, the top k labels and scores);
to our knowledge this setting, which we denote the partial-
information setting, has not been considered in prior work.
Prior work considering constrained threat models have
only considered the black-box restriction we describe
above; previous work primarily uses substitute networks to
emulate the attacked network, and then attack the substi-
tute with traditional first-order white-box methods [13, 14].
However, as discussed thoroughly in [4], this approach is
unfavorable for many reasons including imperfect transfer-
ability of attacks from the substitute to the original model,
and the computational and query-wise cost of training a sub-
stitute network. Recent attacks such as [4] have used fi-
nite difference methods in order to estimate gradients in the
black-box case, but are still expensive, requiring millions of
queries to generate an adversarial image for an ImageNet
classifier. Effects such as low throughput, high latency, and
rate limiting on commercially deployed black-box classi-
fiers heavily impact the feasibility of current approaches to
black-box attacks on real-world systems.
We present an approach for generating black-box ad-
versarial examples based on Natural Evolutionary Strate-
gies [18]. We provide motivation for the algorithm in terms
of finite difference estimation in random Gaussian bases.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the method in prac-
tice, generating adversarial examples with several orders
of magnitude fewer queries compared to existing methods.
We consider the further constrained partial-information set-
ting, and we present a new algorithm for attacking neural
networks under these conditions. We demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of our method by showing that it can reliably
produce targeted adversarial examples with access to par-
tial input-output pairs.
We use the newfound tractability given by these methods
to both (a) generate the first transformation-tolerant black-
box adversarial examples and (b) perform the first targeted
attack on the Google Cloud Vision API, demonstrating the
effectiveness of our proposed method on large, commercial
systems: the GCV API is an opaque (no published enumera-
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
07
11
3v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  6
 A
pr
 20
18
tion of labels), partial-information (queries return only up to
10 classes with uninterpretable “scores”), several-thousand-
way commercially deployed classifier.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a variant of NES inspired by the treate-
ment in [18] as a method for generating black-box ad-
versarial examples. We relate NES in this special case
with the finite difference method over Gaussian bases,
providing a theoretical comparison with previous at-
tempts at black-box adversarial examples.
• We demonstrate that our method is effective in effi-
ciently synthesizing adversarial examples; the method
does not require a substitute network and is 2-3 orders
of magnitude faster than optimized finite difference-
based methods such as [4]. We reliably produce black-
box adversarial examples for both CIFAR-10 and Im-
ageNet classifiers.
• We propose an approach for synthesizing targeted ad-
versarial examples in the “partial information” setting,
where the attacker has access only to top-k outputs of
a classifier, and we demonstrate its effectiveness.
• We exploit the increased efficiency of this method to
achieve the following results:
– Robust black-box examples. In [1], the inabil-
ity of standard-generated adversarial examples to
remain adversarial under transformation is noted,
and the Expectation over Transformation (EOT)
algorithm is introduced. By integrating EOT with
the method presented in this work, we generate
the first transformation-tolerant black-box adver-
sarial examples.
– Targeted adversarial examples against a
several-thousand-way commercial classifier.
We use our method to generate adversarial
examples for the Google Cloud Vision API,
a commercially-deployed system. An attack
against a commercial classifier of this order of
magnitude demonstrates the applicability and re-
liability of our method.
2. Approach
We outline the key technical components of our ap-
proach allowing us to attack the constructed threat model.
First we describe our application of Natural Evolutionary
Strategies [18]. Then, we outline the strategy used to con-
struct adversarial examples in the partial-information set-
ting.
2.1. Natural Evolutionary Strategies
Rather than taking component-wise finite differences as
in previous state-of-the art methods [4], we use natural evo-
lutionary strategies [18]. Natural evolutionary strategies
(NES) is a method for derivative-free optimisation based on
the idea of a search distribution pi(θ|x). In particular, rather
than maximizing the objective function F (x) directly, NES
maximizes the expected value of the loss function under the
search distribution. As demonstrated in Section 4, this al-
lows for gradient estimation in far fewer queries than typical
finite-difference methods. Concretely, for a loss function
F (·) and a current set of parameters x, we have from [18]:
Epi(θ|x) [F (θ)] =
∫
F (θ)pi(θ|x) dθ
∇xEpi(θ|x) [F (θ)] = ∇x
∫
F (θ)pi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
F (θ)∇xpi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
F (θ)
pi(θ|x)
pi(θ|x)∇xpi(θ|x) dθ
=
∫
pi(θ|x)F (θ)∇x log (pi(θ|x)) dθ
= Epi(θ|x) [F (θ)∇x log (pi(θ|x))]
In a manner similar to that in [18], we choose a search
distribution of random Gaussian noise around the current
image x; that is, we have θ = x + σN (0, I). Evaluating
the gradient above with this search distribution yields the
following variance-reduced gradient estimate:
∇E[F (θ)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1
iF (θ + σi)
Similarly to [15], we employ antithetic sampling to gen-
erate batches of i values; rather than generating n val-
ues i ∼ N (0, 1), we instead draw these values for i ∈
{1 . . . n2 }, and set j = −n−j+1 for j ∈ {(n2 + 1) . . . n}.
This optimization has been empirically shown to improve
performance of NES.
Finally, we perform a projected gradient descent update
[11] with momentum based on the NES gradient estimate.
2.1.1 NES as Finite Differences
A closer inspection of the special case of NES that we have
described here suggests an alternative view of the algorithm.
In particular, note that when antithetic sampling is used, the
gradient estimate can be written as the following, whereDv
represents the directional derivative in the direction of v:
∇E[F (x)] ≈ 1
nσ
n∑
i=1
F (x+ σi)i
=
1
n/2
n/2∑
i=1
F (x+ σi)− F (x− σi)
2σ
i
≈ 1
n/2
n/2∑
i=1
Di(x)i
=
1
n/2
n/2∑
i=1
(∇F · i)i
Now, the i are effectively randomly drawn Gaussian
vectors of size width · height · channels. By a well-known
result, these vectors are nearly orthogonal; a formalization
of this is in [7], which says that for an n-dimensional space
and N randomly sampled Gaussian vectors v1 . . . vN ,
N ≤ e δ
2n
4 [− ln(θ)] 12 =⇒ P
{
vi · vj
||vi||||vj || ≤ δ ∀ (i, j)
}
= θ
Thus, one can “extend” the randomly sampled vectors
into a complete basis of the space [0, 1]n; then we can per-
form a basis decomposition on∇F (x) to write:
∇F (x) =
n∑
i=1
〈∇F, i〉i
Thus, the NES gradient can be seen as essentially “clip-
ping” this space to the first N Gaussian basis vectors and
performing a finite-differences estimate.
More concretely, considering a matrix Θ with i being
the columns and the projection Θ(∇F ), we can use results
from concentration theory to analyze our estimate, either
through the following simple canonical bound or a more
complex treatment such as is given in [5]:
P
{
(1− )||∇||2 ≤ ||Θ∇||2 ≤ (1 + )||∇||2} ≥ 1−2e−c2m
Note that even more rigorous analyses of such
“Gaussian-projected finite difference” gradient estimates
and bounds have been demonstrated by works such as [12],
which detail the algorithm’s interaction with dimensional-
ity, scaling, and various other factors.
2.2. Partial-Information Setting
Next, we consider the partial-information setting de-
scribed in the previous section. In particular, we now as-
sume access to both probabilities and gradient approxima-
tions through the methods described in Section 2.1, but only
for the top k classes {y1, . . . , yk}. In normal settings, given
an image and label (xi, y), generating an adversarial exam-
ple (xadv, yadv) for a targeted yadv can be acheived using
standard first-order attacks. These are attacks which involve
essentially ascending the estimated gradient ∇P (yadv|x).
However, in this case P (yadv|xi) (and by extension, its gra-
dient) is unavailable to the classifier.
To resolve this, we propose the following algorithm.
Rather than beginning with the image xi, we instead be-
gin with an image x0 of the original target class. Then yadv
will be in the top-k classes for x0. We perform the follow-
ing iterated optimization:
t = min  s.t. rank (P (yadv|Π(xt−1))) < k
xt = arg max
x
P (yadv|Πt−1(x))
where Π(x) represents the `∞ projection of x onto the
-box of xi. In particular, we concurrently perturb the im-
age to maximize its adversarial probability, while project-
ing onto `∞ boxes of decreasing sizes centered at the origi-
nal image xi, maintaining that the adversarial class remains
within the top-k at all times. In practice, we implement this
iterated optimization using backtracking line search to find
t, and several iterations projected gradient descent (PGD)
to find xt. Alternatingly updating x and  until  reaches the
desired value yields an adversarial example that is -away
from xi while maintaining the adversarial classification of
the original image.
3. Threat model
Our threat model is chosen to model the constraints of
attacking deep neural networks deployed in the real world.
• No access to gradients, logits, or other internals.
Similar to previous work, we define black-box to mean
that access to gradients, logits, and other network in-
ternals is unavailable. Furthermore, the attacker does
not have knowledge of the network architecture. The
attacker only has access to the output of the classifier:
prediction probabilities for each class.
• No access to training-time information. The attacker
has no information about how the model was trained,
and the attacker does not have access to the training
set.
• Limited number of queries. In real-time models like
self-driving cars, the format of the input allows us to
make a large number of queries to the network (e.g.
by disassembling the car, overriding the input signals,
and measuring the output signals). In most other cases,
proprietary ML models like the Google Cloud Vision
API are rate-limited or simply unable to support a large
number of queries to generate a single adversarial ex-
ample.
• Partial-information setting: As discussed in Sec-
tion 1, we also consider in this work the case where
the full output of the classifier is unavailable to the at-
tacker. This more accurately reflects the state of com-
mercial systems where even the list of possible classes
is unknown to the attacker, such as in the Google Cloud
Vision API, Amazon’s Rekognition API, or the Clari-
fai API.
Attackers can have one of two goals: untargeted or tar-
geted misclassification, where targeted attacks are strictly
harder. A successful targeted adversarial example is one
that is classified as a specific target class. An untargeted
adversarial example is one that is misclassified.
Notably, we omit wall-clock time to attack as a security
parameter in our threat model. This metric is more indica-
tive of hardware resources used for the attack than the effi-
cacy of an attack itself, for which query count is a realistic
and practical measure.
4. Evaluation
4.1. Targeted black-box adversarial examples
We evaluate the effectiveness of our black-box attack
in generating targeted adversarial examples for neural net-
works trained on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. We demonstrate
our attack against the CIFAR-10 network of Carlini and
Wagner [3] and the InceptionV3 network [16] in the black-
box setting, assuming access to the output probabilities of
the classifiers. For each of the classifiers, we randomly
choose 1000 examples from the test set, and for each exam-
ple, we choose a random target class. We then use projected
gradient descent (PGD) [11] with NES gradient estimates,
maximizing the log probability of the target class while con-
straining to a maximum `∞ perturbation of  = 0.05. We
use a fixed set of hyperparameters across all attacks on a
single classifier, and we run the attack until we produce an
adversarial image or until we time out (at a maximum of 1
million queries).
Table 1 summarizes the results of our experiment. Our
attack is highly effective and query-efficient, with a 99.6%
success rate on CIFAR-10 with a mean of 4910 queries to
the black-box classifier per example, and a 99.2% success
rate on ImageNet with a mean of 24780 queries to the black-
box classifier per example. Figures 1 and 2 show a sample
of the adversarial examples we produced. Figures 3 and 4
show the distribution of number of queries required to pro-
duce an adversarial example: in most cases, the attack re-
quires only a small number of queries.
Figure 1. Randomly chosen samples from the 1000 adversarial
examples for the CIFAR-10 network.
Figure 2. Randomly chosen samples from the 1000 adversarial
examples for the InceptionV3 network.
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Figure 3. Distribution of number of queries required to generate
an adversarial image with a randomly chosen target class for the
CIFAR-10 network over the 1000 test images.
4.2. Robust black-box adversarial examples
We evaluate the effectiveness of our black-box attack in
generating adversarial examples that fool classifiers over
a distribution of transformations using Expectation-Over-
Transformation (EOT) [1]. In this task, given a distribution
of transformations T and `∞ constraint , we attempt to find
the adversarial example x′ (for some original input x) that
Dataset Original Top-1 Accuracy Attack Success Rate Mean Queries
CIFAR-10 80.5% 99.6% 4910
ImageNet 77.2% 99.2% 24780
Table 1. Quantitative analysis of targeted adversarial attacks we perform on 1000 randomly chosen test images and randomly chosen target
classes. The attacks are limited to 1 million queries per image, and the adversarial perturbations are constrained with l∞,  = .05. The
same hyperparameters were used for all images in each dataset.
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Figure 4. Distribution of number of queries required to generate
an adversarial image with a randomly chosen target class for the
InceptionV3 ImageNet network over the 1000 test images.
maximizes the classifier’s expected output probability of a
target class y over the distribution of inputs T (x′):
x′ = arg max
x′,‖x−x′‖∞≤
Et∼T [logP (y|t(x′))]
We use the PGD attack of [11] to solve the EOT optimiza-
tion problem, using NES to estimate the gradient of the clas-
sifier. Note that P (y|·) is the classifier’s output probability
for label y given an input. In our evaluation we randomly
choose 10 examples from the ImageNet validation set, and
for each example we randomly choose a target class. We
choose our distribution of transformations to be a θ degree
rotation for θ ∼ unif(−30◦, 30◦), and set  = 0.1. We use a
fixed set of hyperparameters across all attacks, and perform
the PGD attack until we achieve greater than 90% adversar-
iality on a random sample of 100 transformations.
Table 2 shows the results of our experiment. We achieve
a mean attack success rate (where attack success rate is
defined for a single adversarial example as the percentage
of randomly transformed samples that classify as the tar-
get class) of 95.7% on our 10 attacks, and use a mean of
3780000 queries per example. Figure 5 shows samples of
the adversarial examples robust up to ±30◦.
4.3. Targeted partial-information adversarial ex-
amples
We evaluate the effectiveness of our partial-information
black-box attack in generating targeted adversarial exam-
ples for the InceptionV3 network when given access to only
the top 10 class probabilities out of the total of 1000 labels.
We randomly choose 1000 examples from the test set, and
for each example, we choose a random target class. For
each source-target pair, we find an example of the target
class in the test set, initialize with that image, and use our
partial-information attack to construct a targeted adversarial
example. We use PGD with NES gradient estimates, con-
straining to a maximum `∞ perturbation of  = 0.05. We
use a fixed set of hyperparameters across all attacks, and we
run the attack until we produce an adversarial example or
until we time out (at a maximum of 1 million queries).
The targeted partial-information attack achieves a 95.5%
success rate with a mean of 104342 queries to the black-box
classifier.
4.4. Attacking Google Cloud Vision
In order to demonstrate the relevance and applicability
of our approach to real-world system, we attack the Google
Cloud Vision API, a commercially available computer vi-
sion suite offered by Google. In particular, we attack the
most general object labeling classifier, which performs n-
way classification on any given image. This case is consid-
erably more challenging than even the typical black-box set-
ting. The number of classes is large and unknown — a full
enumeration of labels is unavailable. The classifier returns
“confidence scores” for each label it assigns to an image,
which seem to be neither probabilities nor logits. The clas-
sifier does not return scores for all labels, but instead returns
an unspecified-length list of labels that varies based on im-
age. Despite these challenges, we successfully demonstrate
the ability of the system to generate black-box adversarial
examples, in both an untargeted attack and a targeted attack.
4.4.1 Untargeted attack
Figure 6 shows an unperturbed image being correctly
labeled as several rifle/rifle-related classes, including
“weapon” and “firearm.” We run the algorithm presented
in this work, but rather than maximizing the probability of
a target class, we write the following loss function based
Original Top-1 Accuracy Mean Attack Success Rate Mean Queries
80.0% 95.7% 3780000
Table 2. Mean attack success rate and mean required queries across the 10 generated adversarial examples on InceptionV3 robust up to
±30◦ rotations.
Original: hard disc
P (true): 100%
P (adv): 0%
P (true): 100%
P (adv): 0%
P (true): 100%
P (adv): 0%
P (true): 100%
P (adv): 0%
Adversarial: bearskin
P (true): 0%
P (adv): 70%
P (true): 3%
P (adv): 45%
P (true): 1%
P (adv): 41%
P (true): 1%
P (adv): 62%
Figure 5. Random sample of adversarial examples robust up to ±30◦ rotations along with classifier probabilities of the adversarial and
natural classes.
on the classification C(x) to minimize the maximum score
assigned to any label semantically similar to “gun”:
F ∗(x) = max
C(x)[“label”]∼“gun′′
C(x)[“score”]
Note that we expand the definition of “misclassification”
to encompass semantic similarity—that is, we are uninter-
ested in a modification that induces a classification of “per-
sian cat” on a “tabby cat.” Applying the presented algorithm
to this loss function with  = 0.1 yields the adversarial ex-
ample shown in Figure 7, definitively demonstrating the ap-
plicability of our method to real-world commercial systems.
4.4.2 Targeted attack
Figure 8 shows an unperturbed image being correctly la-
beled as several skiing-related classes, including “skiing”
and “ski”. We run our partial-information attack to force
this image to be classified as “dog”. Note that the label
“dog” does not appear in the output for the unperturbed im-
age. We initialize the algorithm with a photograph of a dog
(classified by GCV as a dog) and use our partial-information
attack to synthesize an image that looks like the skiers but
is classified as “dog”.
5. Related work
Szegedy et al. (2014) [17] first demonstrated that neural
networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. A number
of techniques have been developed to generate adversarial
examples in the white-box case [6, 3, 9], where an attacker
is assumed to have full access to the model parameters and
architecture.
Previous work has shown that adversarial examples can
be generated in the black-box case by training a substi-
tute model, and then exploiting white-box techniques on
the substitute [13, 14]. However, this attack is unreliable
because it assumes the adversarial examples can transfer to
the target model. At best, the adversarial images are less ef-
fective, and in some cases, attacks may entirely fail to trans-
fer and ensembles of substitute models need to be used [10].
Our attack does not require the transferability assumption.
Recent attempts use finite differences to estimate the gra-
dient instead of training substitute models [4]. However,
even with various query reduction techniques, a large num-
ber of queries are required to generate a single attack image,
potentially rendering real-world attacks and transformation-
tolerant adversarial examples intractable. In comparison,
our method uses several orders of magnitude fewer queries.
Prior work has demonstrated that black-box methods
can feasibly attack real-world, commercially deployed sys-
tems, including image classification APIs from Clarifai,
Figure 6. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labelling on the unper-
turbed image.
Figure 7. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labelling on the ad-
versarial image generated with `∞ bounded perturbation with
 = 0.1: the original class is no longer a returned label.
Metamind, Google, and Amazon [10, 14, 8], and a speech
recognition system from Google [2]. Our work advances
prior work on machine learning systems deployed in the
real world by demonstrating a highly effective and query-
efficient attack against the Google Cloud Vision API in the
partial-information setting, a scenario that has not been ex-
plored in prior work.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we present an algorithm based on natural
evolutionary strategies (NES) which allows for the genera-
tion of adversarial examples in the black-box setting with-
out training a substitute network. We also introduce the
partial-information setting, a more restricted black-box sit-
uation that better models large-scale commercial systems,
and we present an algorithm for crafting targeted adversar-
ial examples for this setting. We motivate our algorithm
through the formulation of NES as a set of finite differences
over a random normal projection, and demonstrate the em-
pirical efficacy of the method by generating black-box ad-
versarial examples orders of magnitude more efficient (in
terms of number of queries) than previous work on both the
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. Using a combination of
the described algorithm and the EOT algorithm, we gener-
Figure 8. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labelling on the unper-
turbed image.
Figure 9. The Google Cloud Vision Demo labelling on the ad-
versarial image generated with `∞ bounded perturbation with
 = 0.1: the image is labeled as the target class.
ate the first robust black-box adversarial examples, which
constitutes a step towards attacking real-world systems. We
also demonstrate the efficacy of our partial-information at-
tack. Finally, we synthesize targeted adversarial examples
for the commercial Google Cloud Vision API, demonstrat-
ing the first targeted attack against a partial-information sys-
tem. Our results point to a promising new method for effi-
ciently and reliably generating black-box adversarial exam-
ples.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Nat Friedman and Daniel Gross.
References
[1] A. Athalye, L. Engstrom, A. Ilyas, and K. Kwok. Synthesiz-
ing robust adversarial examples. 2017.
[2] N. Carlini, P. Mishra, T. Vaidya, Y. Zhang, M. Sherr,
C. Shields, D. Wagner, and W. Zhou. Hidden voice com-
mands. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Se-
curity 16), Austin, TX, 2016.
[3] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robust-
ness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security &
Privacy, 2017.
[4] P.-Y. Chen, H. Zhang, Y. Sharma, J. Yi, and C.-J. Hsieh. Zoo:
Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks to deep
neural networks without training substitute models. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence
and Security, AISec ’17, pages 15–26, New York, NY, USA,
2017. ACM.
[5] S. Dasgupta, D. Hsu, and N. Verma. A concentration theo-
rem for projections. In Conference on Uncertainty in Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 2006.
[6] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and
harnessing adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR),
2015.
[7] A. N. Gorban, I. Y. Tyukin, D. V. Prokhorov, and K. I.
Sofeikov. Approximation with random bases. Inf. Sci.,
364(C):129–145, Oct. 2016.
[8] J. Hayes and G. Danezis. Machine learning as an adversarial
service: Learning black-box adversarial examples. 2017.
[9] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial ex-
amples in the physical world. 2016.
[10] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into trans-
ferable adversarial examples and black-box attacks. In Pro-
ceedings of the International Conference on Learning Rep-
resentations (ICLR), 2017.
[11] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to adver-
sarial attacks. 2017.
[12] Y. Nesterov and V. Spokoiny. Random gradient-free min-
imization of convex functions. Found. Comput. Math.,
17(2):527–566, Apr. 2017.
[13] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks
using adversarial samples. 2016.
[14] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA
CCS ’17, pages 506–519, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[15] T. Salimans, J. Ho, X. Chen, and I. Sutskever. Evolution
strategies as a scalable alternative to reinforcement learning.
CoRR, abs/1703.03864, 2017.
[16] C. Szegedy, V. Vanhoucke, S. Ioffe, J. Shlens, and Z. Wojna.
Rethinking the inception architecture for computer vision.
2015.
[17] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. 2013.
[18] D. Wierstra, T. Schaul, T. Glasmachers, Y. Sun, J. Peters,
and J. Schmidhuber. Natural evolution strategies. J. Mach.
Learn. Res., 15(1):949–980, Jan. 2014.
